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THE SUBTLE VICES BEHIND
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
FRANK B. CROSS*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Few contemporary cows are more sacred than environmentalism
and its underlying values.  Policy controversies are commonly por-
trayed as battles between victimized citizens and corporate polluters
or between innocent animals and rapacious developers.  In this per-
ceived context, who could fail to side with the environmentalists?
Yet the given context represents a misleadingly simplistic false di-
chotomy.  Reality is more complex, and the apparent virtues of envi-
ronmentalism may obscure a darker underside.
The significance of environmental values is highlighted in pre-
vailing controversies pitting public perceptions of risk against more
scientific probabilistic measures.  The probabilistic measures are not
infrequently on the side of the “polluters.”1  While public risk percep-
tions were once cavalierly derided as ignorant, they now are often
lauded as richly value laden. Thompson suggests that a “reasonable
person’s concept of risk, vague as it is, is better suited to the regula-
tory requirements of risk management than are probabilistic con-
cepts.”2  Scientific probabilism, sometimes criticized for inaccuracy, is
more commonly rejected as impoverished in its lack of normative
values.  Scientists themselves are perhaps uncomfortable with subjec-
tivity and may too quickly concede this point.
Science, like all human endeavors, reflects values.  Reliance on
scientific probabilism in environmental policymaking reflects a con-
cern for factual accuracy as a means to achieve goals such as equality
and maximization of life saving within exogenous resource con-
straints.  Reliance on science is broadly consistent with liberty and
democracy.  These values of the scientific method are far more valid
than some of the values underlying public risk perceptions.
Many different issues are relevant to the question of whether lay
opinion should govern public policy.  Some in academia rather
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1. Critics of probabilism have contended that the method furthers a “right-wing political
agenda.”  See William Leiss, Assessing and Managing Risks, 25 POL’Y SCI. 341, 343 (1992).
2. Paul B. Thompson, Risk Objectivism and Risk Subjectivism: When Are Risks Real?, 1
RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH AND SAFETY 3, 22 (1990).
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blithely assume that public values should necessarily be embraced by
risk managers.3  This article focuses on the nature of values central to
public perceptions of risk and strives to persuade the reader that
public values generally should not be relied upon for risk regulation.4
II.  SOURCES OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION
The place of values in public opinions of risk is diverse.  Even in
a democracy, government need not worship at the shrine of public
opinion.  Cass Sunstein has observed in a somewhat different context
that public preferences are quite malleable and may be inappropriate
determinants of government policy.5  Hence, the sources of public
perception must be explored before its results are embraced.
At the outset, it is critical to recognize that public perceptions of
risk can be partly explained by misinformation.  The general public is
subject to a variety of cognitive limitations and gets its risk informa-
tion from systematically and pervasively skewed sources.6  To the ex-
tent that perceptions are grounded in ignorance or bias, they hardly
warrant reliance.
Research suggests that ignorance does not explain fully the
sources of public perception of risk, nor its divergence from scientific
3. See, e.g., Adam Finkel, Afterthoughts, in WORST THINGS FIRST?: THE DEBATE OVER
RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 335, 336-37 (Adam M. Finkel & Do-
minic Golding eds., 1994) (suggesting that citizens’ value assessments should prevail over scien-
tific estimation).  Others have a more nuanced view.  Cass Sunstein suggests that citizens’ value
judgments about risk deserve respect so long as they are “both reflective and informed.”  Cass
R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN L. REV.
247, 267 (1996).  While the thrust of the article appears to credit public perceptions, his caveats
of informed reflection might well obliterate a role for such perceptions.  In addition, he has also
observed that the “mere fact that certain values are expressed through public action does not,
of course, mean that those values must be endorsed.”  Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 71 n.233 (1995).  This article attempts to
elaborate the seldom recognized point that public values about risk may be unworthy of incor-
poration in government regulation.
4. It is also important to recognize that public perception may underestimate risks.
While the typical debate confronts a public perceiving high risk vs. low probability estimates,
the public probably underestimates more risks.  See, e.g., Dermot J. Hayes et al., Valuing Food
Safety in Experimental Auction Markets, 77 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 40 (1995) (documenting
public underestimation of risk from foodborne pathogens).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).  He ob-
serves that the “phenomenon of endogenous preferences casts doubt on the notion that a
democratic government ought to respect private desires and beliefs in all or almost all con-
texts.”  Id. at 5.  With respect to risk perception, see William H. Foege, Plagues: Perceptions of
Risk and Social Responses, 55 SOC. RES. 331, 334-335 (1988) (concluding that we “know from
recent studies that the perception of risk that people have for many conditions is unrealistic,
unstable, and influenced by illusions of control”).
6. See Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 897-912 (1994).
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probabilism.7  Rather, it has been demonstrated that a system of val-
ues also enters the equation.8  A variety of variables have been sug-
gested as reflective of these values (e.g., the catastrophic potential of
risk, voluntariness of risk, etc.).9  Research fairly consistently shows
that the public considers risk factors beyond those of scientific prob-
abilism.10  A recent World Bank study, for example, found that quali-
tative factors could explain material differences in public perception
of risk among various lifesaving programs.11
Identifying the presence of value concerns is easier than deter-
mining precisely what values are of concern to the public.  Some pur-
ported values, such as catastrophic potential, may not in fact explain
public perceptions.12  There is considerable evidence that public per-
ception is driven in material part by at least two factors—a rather
amorphous concept called “dread” and the voluntariness of the risk
at issue.13  I will focus my discussion of risk perception values on these
two concepts and suggest that neither offers a compelling normative
reason to rely on public perception in public health policy.
III.  THE UNFAIRNESS OF PERCEPTIONS OF DREAD
The concept of “dread” risk is central to public perceptions.14
Dread represents a myriad of intercorrelated characteristics, includ-
ing “involuntary, unknown, uncontrollable, [and] unfamiliar” fea-
tures.15  A new development, such as biotechnology, may be dreaded
7. See Paul Slovic et al., Characterizing Perceived Risk, in PERILOUS PROGRESS:
MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 91, 1115 (Robert W. Kates et al. eds., 1985);
George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of
Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719, 735 (1988).  See also Cross, supra note 6, at 891.
8. See Cross, supra note 6, at 889-90.
9. See id. at 891-95.
10. See id. at 892, 898-99.
11. See Maureen L. Cropper & Uma Subramanian, Public Choices Between Lifesaving
Programs: How Important Are Lives Saved?, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING
PAPER No. 1497 (Aug. 1995).  The variation in preference among lifesaving programs was up
to 2.5 times the probabilistic life saving.  This is roughly consistent with other research.  See,
e.g., John M. Mendeloff & Robert M. Kaplan, Are Large Differences in “Lifesaving” Costs Jus-
tified?  A Psychometric Study of the Relative Value Placed on Preventing Deaths, 9 RISK
ANALYSIS 349 (1989) (finding differences up to two-fold in preferences among programs with
equal lifesaving).
12. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 114 (1996) (suggesting that fac-
tors identified as causes of public concern may simply be ways to rationalize such concerns).
People give relatively little heed to certain catastrophic risks, such as dam failure.
13. See Cross supra note 6, at 914-918, 924-926.
14. See id. at 924 n.130.
15. Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, & Baruch Fischhoff, Modeling the Societal Impact of
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because it is unfamiliar to people who have no history of dealing with
its consequences.  Lack of experience enables us to imagine the
worst.
A recent study of food safety perceptions in the United King-
dom demonstrated the importance of dread.16  The authors found that
substances deemed natural, familiar, or often present in food were
not much feared.  By contrast, identifying a risk as “chemical” in-
creased the perception of risk significantly.  This perception is di-
rectly contrary to the findings of the National Academy of Sciences
and other researchers reporting that natural constituents of food are
far more hazardous than any chemical additives.17
Unfamiliarity or lack of empirical experience is not an unrea-
sonable concern. However, such fear of the unfamiliar yields a con-
servative prejudice for the status quo and against meaningful change.
More seriously, a bias for the familiar can produce a nocuous preju-
dice on behalf of the commonplace middle class experience and
against “different” peripheral groups and activities.
Fear of young black men undoubtedly is a species of dread of
those who look, sound, and act differently.  Historically, Americans
have had similar fears about immigrants.  Likewise, the public fear of
AIDS transmission from casual contact (while overlooking risks from
heterosexual intercourse) surely reflects fear of the periphery and
comfort with more familiar practices.  Perceptions of dread risk can
serve as a “powerful tool of an entrenched and xenophobic status quo
against outsiders.”18  Research on perceptions of crime shows that
fear is driven less by actual crime incidence than by such factors as
the presence of “strangers in the neighborhood.”19  Perceived risks of
crime reflect a “distinct middle-class bias” against activities that
“violate the collective sensibilities of middle-class neighborhoods.”20
Dread risk can be a tool to disadvantage those dissimilar to the ma-
jority.
                                                                                                                                     
Fatal Accidents, 30 MGMT. SCI. 464, 467 (1984).
16. Monique M. Raats & Richard Shepherd, Developing a Subject-Derived Terminology to
Describe Perceptions of Chemicals in Foods, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 133 (1996).
17. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
CARNIOGENS AND ANTICARCINOGENS IN THE HUMAN DIET (1996).
18. Frank B. Cross, The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk, 3 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH &
SAFETY 59, 66 (1992).
19. Randy LaGrange, Kenneth Ferraro & Michael Supancic, Perceived Risk and Fear of
Crime: Role of Social and Physical Incivilities, 29 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 311, 319
(1992).
20. Id. at 328.
Fall 1997] THE SUBTLE VICES BEHIND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 155
There is, of course, a moral difference between dread of a dis-
crete and disempowered human minority group and dread of a new
technology.  The evidence on the dread of minority groups must raise
questions about the legitimacy of the general concept, however.  How
can one justify a position that values behind public fear of minorities
are bad but values behind public fear of technology are good, espe-
cially when both are grounded in a similar conservative bias?  The
case for reliance on public perceptions is fundamentally grounded in
a populist vision that the values of the average person are inherently
good, but the all too common presence of racism negates this propo-
sition.  Even if one could theoretically distinguish between fear of
persons and of technologies, the ability to isolate dread of minorities
from dread of technology is not as simple as it might at first seem.
Reliance on public perception must inevitably lead to a focus on
the interests of an empowered and successful majority community
and a concomitant overlooking of the interests of the poorer minor-
ity.  Perceived risk is by its nature majoritarian.  Perceptions have a
further bias in favor of the concerns of the richer.  Those with the
time and income to focus on environmental risks tend to be relatively
well-to-do, at least on average.  Kristin Shrader-Frechette has noted
that “environmentalists tend to be white, middle-aged, middle-class
professionals—not young, blue-collar workers, or blacks.”21  This
relatively advantaged group also has the resources to employ the me-
dia, influence government, and otherwise spread their perceptions.
Disadvantaged groups often have greater concerns than pollu-
tion.  Minorities do have environmental concerns, but their concerns
are often different from those driven by majoritarian perceptions.
Minority communities lack the “organization, financial resources, or
personnel to mount and sustain effective long-term challenges to
such unpopular facilities as municipal and hazardous waste land-
fills.”22  This explains why the populist campaigns of NIMBY (Not In
My Backyard) can functionally become PIBBY (Place In Blacks’
Backyards).23  Business is most likely to place a hazardous waste site
in a locale that is least likely to protest effectively.24  In such a battle
21. KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 21 (1991).
22. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 18 (1990).
23. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Envi-
ronmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 509-510 (1992).
24. See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do with It?  Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
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of political power, the poor usually lose out.  The inequities noted by
authors on “environmental racism” can be attributed to “the fact that
priorities generally have not been based on relative risks, but rather
in response to public pressure.”25
Public perception will not only devalue the environmental con-
cerns of the disadvantaged, but regulations based upon such percep-
tions may well increase the risks presented to the members of disad-
vantaged groups.  The NIMBY/PIBBY effect is but one small
example of this phenomenon.
The unfortunate effects of public perception are pronounced in
pesticide policy.  Austin and Schill, minority environmental activists,
have observed:
In response to pressure from environmentalists concerned about
saving wildlife and protecting the health of the general population,
pesticides of great persistence, but low acute toxicity (like DDT
and chlordane) have been … replaced by pesticides that degrade
rapidly, but are more acutely toxic (like parathion).  The substi-
tutes, of course, pose a greater risk to farmworkers and their off-
spring, who are for the most part people of color.26
Wildausky also noted, “as DDT was phased out and organo-
phosphates were used more, [farmworker] mortalities increased
sharply.”27  Furthermore, banning ethylene dibromide over a phan-
tom public risk likewise increased farmworker risk.28
The shift of risk from the public to blue collar workers is not
limited to the pesticide context.  “[R]educing public risk often means
creating occupational risk,”29 and affected workers tend to be poorer
than the white collar prompters of regulatory action.  Demands to
remove all asbestos from buildings created some risk to removal
25. Albert L. Nichols, Risk-Based Priorities and Environmental Justice, in WORST THINGS
FIRST?, supra note 3, at 267, 268.
26. Regina Austin & Michael H. Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grass-
roots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  69, 78 (1991).
27. AARON B. WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? 73 (1995).
28. See Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms, Process and Politics: Risk and Regulatory De-
sign, in WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 3, at 147, 160 (indicating that the EDB ban was
“based on overblown fears of consumer carcinogenicity and an underestimate of the risks to
pesticide applicators who would be forced to use more carcinogenic substitutes”).
29. Chris Whipple, Nonpessimistic Risk Assessment and De Minimis Risk as Risk Man-
agement Tools, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH
HAZARDS 1109 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 1989).
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workers, even though preexisting risks were often absent.30  Cleaning
up hazardous sites may create several times more risk to workers
than “the health risk from not cleaning up.”31  A government regime
grounded in public perception evinces relatively little concern for oc-
cupational risks faced by discrete groups of blue collar workers.
Even if environmental action does not directly shift risks to the
disadvantaged, the actions may still have regressive opportunity
costs.  When government actions are driven by public perceptions
and pressure groups, those actions generally are responding to mid-
dle class concerns and ignoring the problems of the poor.  EPA acted
vigorously to address problems that later proved overstated at largely
white communities in Love Canal and Times Beach, but failed to at-
tend comparably to minority communities.32  Penalties for violations
of hazardous waste laws tend to be lower in minority areas, sites in
these areas wait longer for cleanup, and weaker remedies are em-
ployed.33  Economically advantaged communities tend to have more
Superfund sites designated for cleanup, so that the “net effect of
cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites is most likely to redis-
tribute resources regressively from consumers and taxpayers chiefly
to wealthier and better-educated communities.”34  After statistically
demonstrating this effect, Hird ascribed the explanation to “public
opinion.”35  “Environmental reforms” are too often “used to direct
social and economic resources away from problems of the poor to-
ward priorities of the affluent.”36
In addition to shifting risks to the disadvantaged, environmental
regulations often burden the disadvantaged with a disproportionate
share of their costs.  While environmentalists may believe that com-
pliance costs are borne by captains of industry, the bulk of these costs
30. See Frank B. Cross, Asbestos in Schools: A Remonstrance Against Panic, 11 COLUM J.
ENVTL. L. 73 (1986).
31. JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16 (1995).
32. See Tom Arrandale, Environmentalism and Racism, GOVERNING, February 1992, at
63 (reporting how EPA “overlooked minority protests by approving such objectionable proj-
ects as a PCB disposal facility in predominantly black Warren County, North Carolina, and a
hazardous waste landfill in Kettleman City, a Latino farmworker community in California”).
33. See Marianne Lavell & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT. L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
34. John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund, 12 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 323, 338 (1993).
35. See id.
36. BULLARD, supra note 22, at 17.
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are passed on to consumers.37  The result is a distribution of costs that
is “even more regressive than the typical sales tax.”38  Even if costs
are not passed on directly by way of prices, companies may lay off
workers, and such layoffs are most commonly felt in occupations that
have “provided the best employment opportunities for the poor.”39
Regulatory costs may also be reflected in lower wage rates.40  One ef-
fect of environmental action is often to siphon money from the poor
to promote the interests of the more advantaged.
Some of the greatest inequity can arise from the anti-technology
bias of public concepts of dread.41  The attack on technological ad-
vance characterizes much within perceived risk, yet such dread can
readily become a beggar-thy-neighbor policy adversely affecting dis-
crete groups of needy individuals.  A group of prominent scientists,
including 27 Nobel laureates, warned of an “irrational ideology which
is opposed to scientific and industrial progress,” that remains the key
to “overcoming major problems like overpopulation, starvation and
worldwide diseases.”42  Technological advance has historically bene-
fited disadvantaged groups.43  Bayard Rustin complained of anti-
37. See H. David Robison, Who Pays for Industrial Pollution Abatement?, REV. ECON.
STAT. 702, 703 (1985).
38. Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health
Analysis, 22 ECOL. L.Q. 729, 763 (1995) (citing multiple studies on the regressive incidence of
pollution control costs).  The costs of water pollution control requirements in Boston report-
edly have forced 100,000 households to “cut back on food, clothing, and medical care.”  David
Stipp, Poor Pay a Big Price to Drink Clean Water, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992, at B1.
39. Cross, supra note 38, at 763.  See also Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the
Costs of Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 106 (1994) (suggesting that environmental
regulations shift job opportunities from manufacturing to white collar occupations).
40. See Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glenn Thomas, Predation Through Regulation: The Wage
and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental
Protection Agency, 30 J.L. & ECON. 239, 246 (1987).
41. It is suggested that “[a]voiding technological risks is a central preoccupation of our
age.”  SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 1 (1986); see gener-
ally, Robin Gregory, James Flynn, & Paul Slovic, Technological Stigma, AM. SCI., May/June
1995, at 220-223.
42. Beware of False Gods in Rio, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1992, at A12.
43. For a vigorous liberal defense of technology and criticism of much contemporary envi-
ronmentalism as Luddite, see Walter Truett Anderson, There’s No Going Back to Nature,
MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 34.  The anti-technology bias of ecofeminism is particularly
ironic, as women have consistently benefited from advances.  See also Johana Brenner &
Nancy Holmstrom, Women’s Self-Organization, 34 MONTHLY REV. 34 (1983) (technology had
enabled women to advance in the workplace); Sharon Camp, Population: The Critical Decade,
FOREIGN POL’Y, March 22, 1993, at 126 (describing how additional technological advance can
“further improve women’s status and economic security”).  In poorer nations, the
“preservation of species and the protection of nature” have depended “upon social exclusion of
races, of women, and of other nationalities.”  Cecile Jackson, Environmentalisms and Gender
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growth environmentalists, who “would condemn the black under-
class, the slum proletariat, and rural blacks to permanent poverty.”44
Dread of change is inherently a conservative, status quo impulse that
offers little to those unhappy with the status quo.
Scientific probabilism, as an alternative to public perception, is
no panacea for all the environmental problems of the poor.  But at
least such probabilism treats all lives as of equal concern.  Histori-
cally speaking, there has been a “rough equation of a more ‘scientific’
social order with a more egalitarian one.”45 Vice President Al Gore,
while a United States Senator, recognized the equity of science in
proposing the Environmental Justice Act of 1992.46  His proposal for
advancing environmental equity was grounded in basing policy on the
best scientific evaluations of the health problems associated with en-
vironmental contamination.47
There is evidence confirming the virtue of using a scientific
method for determining environmental policy.  Perhaps the greatest
success story in environmental regulation involves lead—a substance
that created unusually great health harms, most of which were felt by
the urban poor.  The elimination of lead in gasoline and other regula-
tory measures reduced exposures and attendant consequences dra-
matically.48 Regulation of lead stands out from most government ac-
tion because it was driven by science rather than public perceptions.49
The experience stands as a compelling example of how a strategy
grounded in scientific probabilism “would appear to represent a ma-
jor gain for minority communities.”50  The Harvard School of Public
Health has similarly noted that risks to disadvantaged groups “do not
receive sufficient governmental priority precisely because the limited
                                                                                                                                     
Interests in the Third World, 24 DEV. & CHANGE 649, 654 (1993).
44. WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF EN-
VIRONMENTALISM 37 (1982).  Carl Anthony describes a Berkeley public hearing at which anti-
development environmentalists booed blacks testifying on the need for jobs, causing him to feel
as if he were dealing with the Ku Klux Klan.  See Carl Anthony, Eco-Justice, TURNING WHEEL,
Spring 1993, at 19.
45. PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT
AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE 22 (1994).
46. S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992).
47. See id.
48. See Sandra Blakeslee, Concentrations of Lead in Blood Drop Steeply, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 1994, at A18 (reporting a 78% reduction in lead levels in the bloodstream of the affected
public).
49. See Nichols, supra note 25, at 270.
50. Id. at 268.
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political power of disadvantaged populations is not counteracted by
the use of comparative risk analysis.”51
The illiberal nature of public perception of dread risks should
not be too surprising.  The history of American populism is tainted
by Anti-Semitism, nativism, and intolerance, expressed by the likes of
Gerald L. K. Smith and Father Coughlin.52  Today’s populism is
similarly characterized by a “white backlash.”53  The middle class en-
thusiasms of environmental populism may be likewise objectionable,
if more indirectly.  Even if the poor seek to develop a countermove-
ment of populism, they lack the resources to be effective.  Public
dread is a poor guide for policymaking.
IV.  THE SELFISHNESS OF PERCEPTIONS OF VOLUNTARINESS
Risk perception research has consistently found a difference in
public attitudes toward “voluntary” and “involuntary” exposures to
risk.  Other factors being equal, an activity that seems fundamentally
voluntary in nature (such as skydiving) will be perceived as relatively
less risky than an activity that appears essentially involuntary (such as
breathing polluted air).  For example, some observers have com-
plained that the individuals who argue most strongly against envi-
ronmental exposure to carcinogens may also be cigarette smokers.54
While some inconsistency is apparent, these individuals can respond
that smoking, while very risky, is a voluntary choice that they have
made for themselves.  They have little option when it comes to
breathing the local ambient air.  It has been suggested that this volun-
tariness factor can explain the one thousand fold variations in risk
perception.55
Voluntariness has a legitimate value foundation, recognizing the
right to control one’s own body.  When a person chooses to accept a
voluntary risk, she does so in a manner consistent with her personally
perceived benefits of the risky activity, as well as her future plans,
51. HARVARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, REFORM OF RISK REGU-
LATION: ACHIEVING MORE PROTECTION AT LESS COST 18 (1995).
52. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1948);
Victor Ferkiss, Populist Influences on American Fascism, 10 WESTERN POL. Q. 350 (1957)
53. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS
CRITICS 504 (1991).
54. See Janet M. Fitchen, Cultural Values affecting Risk Perception: Individualism and the
Perception of Toxicological Risks, in NEW RISKS: ISSUES AND MANAGEMENT 602 (Louis A.
Cox, Jr. & Paolo F. Ricci, eds., 1990).
55. See M. Granger Morgan, Choosing and Managing Technology-Induced Risk, in
READINGS IN RISK 21 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 1990).
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value preferences and other factors.  This process produces risk deci-
sions best suited to that person, who is treated as an individual and
not a mere cipher amongst the public body.
There is a moral difference between choosing to smoke and
blowing your smoke into the face of another.  Voluntariness also in-
vokes procedural values.  Even if one does not mind an imposition, it
is nice to be asked.  Shrader-Frechette has vigorously emphasized the
importance of this value, declaring that “no matter how experts de-
fine a hazard, its imposition is ethically justifiable only if the persons
affected by it have given free informed consent and are compensated
for the danger they face.”56  This position has obvious deontological
appeal.
Legal doctrines such as informed consent reflect the appeal of
voluntariness.  In medicine, we do not ask if the patient is an expert,
nor do we inquire of her faulty risk perceptions.  She generally re-
tains the right to consent to a medical risk or not.  The doctrine is
grounded in respect for human dignity.  Reliance on voluntary risk
acceptance also helps ensure that the same individuals incur both the
risk and the benefit of an activity, thereby helping ensure fairness in
risk policy.
Obviously, voluntariness merits some consideration in risk
regulation.  However, its practical application in the context of risk
regulation is problematic.  Significant reliance upon a voluntariness
criterion is naive and often a reflection of bias.
The first problem with voluntariness is in its definition.  In the
context of public values, the issue is not so much actual voluntariness
as public perceptions of voluntariness.57  Such public perceptions of
voluntariness may be skewed much as perceptions of probabilistic
risk are skewed.  Such skewing may also reflect a classist bias, as de-
scribed above.
Indeed, the definition of voluntariness is more difficult than gen-
erally acknowledged.  In a Skinnerian world, no risks are truly volun-
tary, because we are conditioned, genetically or environmentally, to
make certain decisions.  By contrast, in the world of Coase, virtually
all risks are voluntary, because one can bargain for their elimination.
While public perception subscribes to neither extreme, the defini-
tional problem remains.
56. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 21, at 86.
57. See MARGOLIS, supra note 12, at 39 (noting that characteristics like voluntariness
mean “perceived voluntariness”).
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Consider for example occupational risks, often deemed to be ac-
cepted voluntarily.  Various studies have found that workers seem to
receive higher compensation in exchange for their acceptance of
higher risks of accidents or other harms.  This certainly seems like a
voluntary acceptance of risk.  The true voluntariness of the exchange
may be somewhat tainted by the presence of a severe family need for
higher income.  In times of unemployment, it is increasingly difficult
to accept the decision to take work as a purely voluntary choice.  To
the honors graduate of Harvard Law School, the choice of an em-
ployer may seem a voluntary one.  To the average blue collar worker,
the voluntariness is not so clear.58  There is surely some component of
voluntariness to many occupational decisions.  Yet the decision is not
wholly voluntary.  The binary nature of the voluntary/involuntary dis-
tinction inevitably breaks down.
Occupational risk is not the only area in which voluntariness is
debatable.  One of the largest sources of risk in contemporary society
is driving.  The decision to own and drive an automobile is partially
voluntary.  Yet in many American cities, driving a car is a virtual
condition of employment.  No matter how safely one drives, he re-
mains hostage to the driving behaviors of others.  Is the risk of an
automobile accident voluntary?  Are risks to pedestrians voluntary
once they choose to cross a street?
The above examples are commonplace.  One survey found sub-
stantial disagreement among how individuals rated the
“voluntariness of technologies such as prescription antibiotics, com-
mercial aviation, handguns, and home appliances.”59  A study of air
pollution risk found voluntariness highly perceptual and dependent
upon personality type.  Ninety-two percent of risk averse individuals
considered the risk from smelter emissions involuntary, but sixty-four
percent of more risk tolerant individuals believed the risk to be a
voluntary one.60  At some level, a person makes a voluntary decision
to live and work in a particular community.
A second shortcoming of voluntariness is information.  In the
historic recognition of voluntariness in medical practice, consent
58. See, e.g., Annette Baier, Poisoning the Wells, in VALUES AT RISK 66 (Douglas Ma-
cLean ed., 1986) (observing that a coal miner might accept his employment out of compulsion,
“even when he is not, like a member of a chain gang, literally coerced into working there”).
59. Baruch Fischhoff, Risk: A Guide To Controversy, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION app. C, 273 (1989).
60. See Brian Baird, Tolerance for Environmental Health Risks: The Influence of Knowl-
edge, Benefits, Voluntariness, and Environmental Attitudes, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 425, 430 (1986).
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must be sufficiently informed to be meaningful, and uninformed con-
sent is not considered to be a truly voluntary choice.  The concept of
informed consent typically serves to undermine efforts to rest upon
the concept of voluntary risk.  Few people have the time or inclina-
tion to inform themselves of each of the myriad of risks found in the
world.  Few if any of the risks of everyday living could therefore be
considered voluntary.  Ms. Shrader-Frechette provides a hypothetical
example of the difficulty:
Consider, for example, the type of community most likely to accept
a particularly dirty, dangerous factory or a controversial toxic waste
dump.  It would, very likely, be a town where people needed the
jobs, or the tax benefits of the facility, or where levels of education
about the relevant dangers of the facility were less known than in
other places.  In other words, the communities least able to give
free, informed consent to a risk are typically those that allegedly
consent.61
This reasoning is consistent with principles underlying informed
consent but it potentially obliterates the voluntariness standard for
environmental risks to public health.
One suspects that detailed investigations into consent are not in-
corporated in public perceptions.  Most would consider the explicit
acceptance of the toxic waste dump to be voluntary.  This aspect of
public attitudes about risk is grounded less in actual voluntariness
than in perceptions of voluntariness.62  As voluntariness reduces
merely to perceptions of voluntariness (which may themselves be fac-
tually inaccurate), the moral legitimacy of the consideration dwin-
dles.  The moral compulsion of respect for human autonomy is
grounded in actual, not perceived, voluntariness.  Furthermore, the
typical American’s perception of voluntariness may fail to appreciate,
and therefore be biased against, the situation faced by the disadvan-
taged.
A third shortcoming of the voluntariness standard is its unreal-
izability in a complex interdependent society such as ours.  Take the
considerable risks attendant to driving an automobile.  As a driver, I
impose some risk of harm upon everyone nearby.  Must I obtain their
consent before driving?  Such consent cannot be easily presumed.  I
61. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 21, at 73.
62. See Baird, supra note 60, at 430 (suggesting that the distinction is between an event
“perceived as voluntary while the other is perceived as involuntary”).
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suspect that there are pedestrians and bicyclists who would quite
readily withhold their consent from all operators of automobiles.63
Similar complexity exists for pollution.  Must every new business
(homeowner?) receive informed consent from everyone potentially
exposed to emissions, however small?
The fourth and most serious defect of the voluntariness standard
is that it is fundamentally an individualist, selfish standard.  It is
widely recognized that taking a polluting action imposes externalities.
Coase notwithstanding, it seems less widely recognized that voluntary
risk-taking or withholding consent for involuntary risks may likewise
impose external costs upon others.64
In the context of voluntary risks, the risk takers reap the benefits
of their activity, while some of the costs of the risk-taking are shifted
to society.  Leiss and Chociolko note that “the risk-averse segment of
the population is compelled to share the losses of the risk-prone.”65
When the risk ultimately materializes, at least some of the costs are
shifted to society (through helicopter rescues, medical care, disability
payments, etc.).  They go on to protest that it is “unreasonable, illogi-
cal, economically ruinous, and ultimately self-defeating to seek to
protect citizens from involuntary exposure to certain risk levels if,
simultaneously, many of those selfsame citizens voluntarily expose
themselves to levels of other risks that are often higher by several or-
ders of magnitude.”66  I suggest that the externalities of refusing to
consent to involuntary risks are vast and far greater than the external
consequences of voluntary risk-taking.
To consider the potential selfishness of a voluntariness standard,
take the following analysis.  One might voluntarily accept a risk such
as skiing or smoking, thinking: “I will accept X amount of risk from
activity Y, knowing that I personally will reap the enjoyment from
the activity.”  The same individual might subsequently decide: “I will
not accept even X/100 amount of risk from activity Z, because I per-
ceive few if any direct benefits to me from this activity, how ever
much it may benefit others.”  Fischoff has noted that the “acceptable-
63. See Andreas Teuber, Justifying Risk, 119 DAEDALUS 235, 249 (1990) (suggesting that
“you are not morally required to obtain the permission of everyone who might be in the path of
your car should it go out of control on your way to the post office”).
64. Joel Feinberg contends that risks to life cannot be so automatically prohibited without
considering “the independent value of the risk-creating conduct both to the actor himself, to
others directly affected by it, and to society in general.”  JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS
191 (1984).
65. WILLIAM LEISS & CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 57 (1994).
66. Id. at 265.
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technology principle is exclusively egoistic” as “individuals judge the
acceptability of a technology solely by the risks and benefits that they
personally receive from it.”67
The egoism appears pervasive in public risk perceptions.  The
entire thrust of the NIMBY movement is based on transferring risks
to the yards of others.  The public rejected the regulation of risks
from saccharin and compulsory seat belt interlocks, because they di-
rectly felt the inconvenience of these government actions.  Yet the
public is quicker to demand regulation of much smaller risks, so long
as the cost and inconvenience of regulation is transferred to others.
Michael Fumento provides an interesting and obvious example
of this selfishness phenomenon.  After some research suggested that
electromagnetic fields from overhead public power lines might in-
crease the risk of cancer, people in Boulder, Colorado complained of
the undue risk and demanded that the overhead power lines in their
city be buried.  The city responded that it would not pay to reduce
this highly uncertain risk but stated that the concerned citizens
“could form a special district and pay the costs” themselves to reduce
their perceived risks.68  This decision was not compelled by poverty;
Boulder is a rather well off town.  Rather, the citizens made the per-
fectly logical choice that no risk is acceptable so long as others will
pay to prevent it.  More risks become acceptable once one assumes
the burden of prevention.
A new book by Howard Margolis suggests that such concepts of
selfishness69 (generally not his word) are fundamental to public risk
perceptions.  He claims, less cynically, not that the perceptions are
necessarily selfish, but notes that costs are often “off-screen” and not
considered.70 Whether people are selfishly ignoring costs to others or
are unaware of those costs, the results are the same.  Margolis ob-
serves that when his condition of fungibility exists (the same people
who benefit also bear the costs), the public perceptions suddenly be-
67. Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, 5 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH
AND SAFETY 1, 23 (1994).  This effect translates into policy—politicians are notoriously hesi-
tant to legislate or regulate when large numbers of citizens are directly involved in the risk-
creating activity.  See also WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS
149 (1994).
68. See MICHAEL FUMENTO, SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: BALANCING TECHNOLOGY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 255 (1993).
69. Margolis refers to the situation as “fungibility,” where the same person bears both the
risk and reaps the benefits.  See MARGOLIS, supra note 12, at 76-77.  In the absence of fungibil-
ity, individuals can make selfish choices contrary to society’s best interests.
70. See id. at 129.
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come “much more balanced.”71  Thus, there is reason to believe that
selfishness, or the absence of fungibility, explains much of the diver-
gence between public and expert estimates of risk.72
While advocates of extensive regulation have relied upon the
voluntariness/consent criterion, it is noteworthy that the approach
represents the underlying morality of the untrammeled free market.
Reliance on consent to risk has roots in a “libertarian, individualistic
political ideal” that “forbids one person from imposing unconsented-
to burdens on another.”73  An individualistic consent philosophy is
inherently in conflict with a call for government regulation that by its
very nature questions the reasonability of a laissez faire market ap-
portionment of risk.  Consent historically has been justified as
“instrumental to economic efficiency” and supported by Americans’
“abiding, almost obsessive suspicion of state power.”74  Amitai Etzi-
oni observes that individual choice is fundamental to the neoclassical
economic paradigm that he calls “misplaced liberty.”75  Requiring to-
tal consent is a philosophy of atomistic individualism.
A primary role of democratic government is to take actions in
the overall public benefit without the need to obtain individual con-
sent from each affected individual.76  While the overall structure of
our government is dependent on the consent of the governed, this
does not imply that every government action be hostage to the con-
sent of each and every citizen.  Paying income tax is not voluntary,
eminent domain requires compensation but not consent, and most of
our wars were not fought with an army of volunteers.
Of course, our government is limited in its powers—it cannot sti-
fle speech, for example, without consent.  Consent still has some vir-
71. See id. at 169.
72. Margolis would emphasize that the key to decision making is not the actual fungibility
of risks and benefits, but the perceptions of risks and benefits.  Thus, an individual decides
based on whether he or she perceives personal benefits from an activity, not whether actual
benefits accrue.  This does not change the deontological selfishness of the choice, but does sug-
gest that some people are incompetent at being selfish.
73. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 283 (1985).
74. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 901 (1994).
75. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 9-10
(1988).
76. See MARGOLIS, supra note 12, at 40 (observing that “[w]e ordinarily see it as selfish for
an individual to insist on absolute protection of his rights and property with no regard for the
costs to others or to society generally” and that “we do not feel that it is unfair if the commu-
nity is less than sympathetic to people demanding their rights when no significant harm is
threatened”).
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tues, one of which is to prevent a general utilitarian standard that
sanctions “using members of a minority who are most at risk so as to
benefit the majority.”77 Yet this approach overlooks the externalities
of the consent requirement.  An individual withholding consent could
likewise injure a discrete minority78 or even the majority.
At this point, some will surely object to such a parallelism of
consequences.  They would dispute the equivalency of a physical risk
(to life) from an activity and the economic consequences (to the pol-
luter) from withheld consent.  Yet, as noted above, this reflects a
false dichotomy and simplistic vision of economic consequences.  The
economic consequences felt by the poor in itself presents a risk to
life.79
There is a simpler and more direct response, however.  The ex-
ternalities of withheld consent will most often take the form of physi-
cal risks to the lives of others.  After urging the consent standard,
Shrader-Frechette acknowledges an exception in that “people do not
have the right to refuse vaccination, because, if many do so, they will
put other citizens at risk.”80  Yet this exception in practice will prove
so large as to virtually swallow the entire consent rule.
People naively perceive that there is such a thing as a risk-free
lunch, that government action taken to prevent one risk is unlikely to
create a countervailing risk.  We increasingly know that this is not the
case.  Although Lester Lave noted the possibility of countervailing
risk some time ago, the concept has only recently received an audi-
ence.  John Graham and Jonathan Wiener detailed how risk reduc-
tion efforts may create even greater countervailing risks in nine pub-
lic health policy areas.81  When a refusal to accept a certain risk has
the effect of creating additional risks for others, the calculus of con-
sent is changed.
77. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 21, at 117.
78. Surely some whites in places such as Vidor, Texas perceive that allowing blacks or his-
panics to settle in their community would present a physical risk.  Yet we do not require the
consent of each citizen before authorizing a minority housing project in the community.
79. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 38.
80. SCHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 21, at 218.  Indeed, the consent requirement can
descend into circularity and nihilism.  If your withholding consent creates a risk to me, do you
need my consent before withholding your consent?
81. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 31; See also, Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils
of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) (where I recently provided
somewhat less detailed accounts of dozens of circumstances in which efforts to reduce one risk
have created greater countervailing risks).
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The above analysis is not sufficient to invalidate all considera-
tion of consent.  There are some obvious situations where risk-taking
is clearly voluntary and relatively well informed.  These circum-
stances call for less regulation.  There are doubtless also situations in
which a group of individuals is suffering an essentially involuntary
risk, with little unavoidable countervailing risk from controls.  This
situation calls for more regulation.  It is not wise or proper, however,
to require consent as a condition to exposure to all involuntary risks
in our complex times.
Scientific probabilism has a substantial role in defining the pe-
rimeters of the voluntarism/consent standard for risks.  In medicine,
courts that have strictly required a patient’s informed consent to pro-
cedures have limited the required disclosures to risks that are
“material.”82  Although there is no uniform definition of materiality,
courts consistently invoke scientific probabilities to determine
whether the materiality of a risk is sufficient to compel a warning.  In-
formed consent and voluntary choice are required only for risks that
are significant.  In the context of broader environmental risks, the
materiality standard should be expanded to at least consider the risks
of withheld consent.
Of course, materiality could be based on public perceptions of
risk rather than scientific probabilities.83  Indeed, this seems to be the
prevailing approach in risk regulation, if not in medical malpractice
law.  Voluntary versus involuntary risks requiring consent would thus
be determined according to public perceptions of voluntariness and
the need for consent.  However, this approach is not only vulnerable
to inaccurate perceptions, it also compounds the very problem that
consent was meant to remedy.  Remember Shrader-Frechette’s
warning about the ability of a majority to impose an unreasonable
risk upon a minority, absent a consent requirement.  If the majority
also determines when consent is required, no protection would be of-
fered, allowing the majority even greater opportunity for unfair risk
distribution.
The medical cases correctly condition consent on material, scien-
tifically determined risks.  This approach protects minorities from
probabilistically significant risks, and prevents individuals from self-
82. See Schuck, supra note 74, at 939.
83. Rick Pildes has suggested to me that the nature of voluntariness and the necessity of
consent might be defined by a communitarian assessment of risk.  While this alleviates some of
the obvious practicality problems of requiring consent for environmental risks, the approach
simultaneously obliterates much of the libertarian appeal of the consent standard itself.
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ishly and even destructively withholding consent to de minimis risks.
While scientific conclusions may be biased or wrong, they are consis-
tently less biased and more accurate than the alternative of public
perception.84
V.  DEMOCRACY DOES NOT COMPEL RELIANCE ON PUBLIC
PERCEPTION
Some might argue that a democracy should reflect the will of its
constituents, even if it is marked by xenophobic dread or selfish vol-
untariness.  This position reflects an oversimplistic vision of democ-
racy, or at least of the sort of representative government in the
United States that we commonly call democracy.  It is now common
to acknowledge that we are a deliberative democracy that does not
move with each shift in the polling numbers.85  This point is increas-
ingly recognized in the context of risk regulation.86  Reliance on scien-
tific probabilism tends, over the long run, to promote democratic
governance.87
Reliance on public perception could even be undemocratic in na-
ture.  Most American’s may not want regulation which is based upon
the public perceptions of the majority. For example, a majority of
citizens believe to some degree in astrology.  However, this does not
necessarily mean that they want government policy made by astrolo-
gers.  Most Americans want environmental policies based centrally
84. See MARGOLIS, supra note 12, at 31 (contending that “it is hard to believe that there
has never been a single good case in which lay judgment turned out to be better than expert
judgment”).
85. See, e.g., JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 36 (1991) (generally
making the case for deliberation over a plebiscitary democracy); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 4
(noting that U.S. democracy is deliberative and involves “institutions of representation” rather
than “an aggregation of interests”).
86. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 59 (suggesting that “[o]urs is a republic, not a
pure democracy, and a high premium is placed on deliberation rather than on snapshots of
public opinion”); Cross, supra note 6, at 953 (urging that deliberation be a fundamental aspect
of risk governance).  The Harvard School of Public Health risk policy group contends that it “is
not plausible to think that existing risk regulation reflects a considered democratic judgment,”
as it “appears to be a response to sensationalistic anecdotes, or to interest-group pressures,
rather than to deliberative judgments by the public about priorities for risk management.”
HARVARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, supra note 51, at 17.
87. See Cross, supra note 18, at 68-69 (relating the liberating effects of reliance on science
vs. subjectivism).  John Graham contends that the transparency of scientific analysis “is consis-
tent with the principles of Jeffersonian democracy.”  John D. Graham, Hammers Don’t Cut
Wood, Why We Need Pollution Prevention and Comparative Risk Assessment, in WORST
THINGS FIRST?: THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES
229, 233 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994).
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upon scientific understanding.88 Many adamant environmentalists feel
likewise.89 Perhaps this is based in the public’s modest recognition of
their limitations or in the pragmatic limits of perception-based poli-
cies.90  It is perfectly democratic to contend that risk policies should
be driven by scientific probabilism rather than public perception.
While public perceptions are driven to some degree by factors
such as dread and voluntarism, people do not necessarily want these
“values” incorporated in government decisionmaking.  While people
demonstrate a relative dread of pesticides, they may still prefer gov-
ernment to pursue regulations of substances according to compara-
tive risk.91  Even studies that find some effect of values on prefer-
ences for lifesaving expenditures conclude that the significance of the
values on government choices is not great.92  The government appears
to have gone overboard, deferring to public attitudes far more than
the public itself might choose.93  A policy of deferring to public atti-
tudes might not even further the ends of those attitudes, as public
perception is so protean that it might preclude effective governmen-
tal action.94
Reliance on public perception could also cost lives.  To the ex-
tent that such reliance shifts risks to other groups or compels the inef-
ficient allocation of government resources, more will die than under a
88. See John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 382, 399 (1995)
(suggesting that people “recognize that it is dangerous to allow the whims of journalists and
public opinion to be the primary determinants of risk policy”); Frank B. Cross, Why Shouldn’t
We Regulate the Worst Things First?, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 312, 317-318 (1996) (citing various
sources indicating that credibility of environmental policy depends on grounding in sound sci-
ence).
89. For example, Anne and Paul Ehrlich’s most recent book relies centrally on scientific
justifications of environmentalism.  PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, BETRAYAL OF
SCIENCE AND REASON (1996).
90. When government policies are based on public perceptions, they tend to produce only
symbolic action with relatively little beneficial effect.  See John Dwyer, The Pathology of Sym-
bolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
91. See John Horowitz, Preferences for Pesticide Regulation, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 396
(1994) (finding particular concern for pesticide regulation vs. auto exhaust regulation but also
discovering that 71% of subjects would prefer the regulation that saved the most lives regard-
less of the risk source).
92. See, e.g., John M. Mendeloff & Robert M. Kaplan, Are Large Differences in
“Lifesaving” Costs Justified?  A Psychometric Study of the Relative Value Placed on Preventing
Deaths, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 349 (1989) (finding variance in public value preferences to be far
smaller than actual differences in government actions to reduce risk).
93. See id.
94. See Cross, supra note 6, at 933 (quoting former EPA Administrator William Reilly to
the effect that “public concerns are constantly changing, demanding that we make everything a
top priority”).
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regime of scientific probabilism.  This end might be justified demo-
cratically, as nothing in the Constitution demands maximization of
lifesaving.  Yet to the extent that public perception functions to sys-
tematically shift risks to disadvantaged populations, we should be
troubled by a policy that causes more deaths.
Democracy means that strongly held and persistent public de-
mands cannot be ignored.  Public perceptions must inevitably play
some role in risk regulation.  Government should however, have a
presumption in favor of scientific probabilism, and require evidence
that the public perceptions are widely held and persistent before ac-
quiescing in them.  Fortunately, government policy appears to be
moving in precisely this direction.
